Using the president’s tweets to understand political diversion in the age of social media by Lewandowsky, Stephan et al.
                          Lewandowsky, S., Jetter, M., & Ecker, U. K. H. (2020). Using the
president’s tweets to understand political diversion in the age of social
media. Nature Communications, 11, [5764 (2020)].
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19644-6
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY
Link to published version (if available):
10.1038/s41467-020-19644-6
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Nature Research at
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19644-6 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the
publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/
ARTICLE
Using the president’s tweets to understand political
diversion in the age of social media
Stephan Lewandowsky 1,2✉, Michael Jetter2,3,4 & Ullrich K. H. Ecker2
Social media has arguably shifted political agenda-setting power away from mainstream
media onto politicians. Current U.S. President Trump’s reliance on Twitter is unprecedented,
but the underlying implications for agenda setting are poorly understood. Using the president
as a case study, we present evidence suggesting that President Trump’s use of Twitter diverts
crucial media (The New York Times and ABC News) from topics that are potentially harmful
to him. We find that increased media coverage of the Mueller investigation is immediately
followed by Trump tweeting increasingly about unrelated issues. This increased activity, in
turn, is followed by a reduction in coverage of the Mueller investigation—a finding that is
consistent with the hypothesis that President Trump’s tweets may also successfully divert the
media from topics that he considers threatening. The pattern is absent in placebo analyses
involving Brexit coverage and several other topics that do not present a political risk to the
president. Our results are robust to the inclusion of numerous control variables and exam-
ination of several alternative explanations, although the generality of the successful diversion
must be established by further investigation.
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On August 4, 2014, a devastating earthquake maimed andkilled thousands in China’s Yunnan province. Withinhours, Chinese media were saturated with stories about
the apparent confession by an Internet celebrity to have engaged
in gambling and prostitution. News about the earthquake was
marginalized, to the point that the Chinese Red Cross implored
the public to ignore the celebrity scandal. The flooding of the
media with stories about a minor scandal appeared to have been
no accident, but represented a concerted effort of the Chinese
government to distract the public’s attention from the earthquake
and the government’s inadequate disaster preparedness1. This
organized distraction was not an isolated incident. It has been
estimated that the Chinese government posts around 450 million
social media comments per year2, using a 50-cent army of
operatives to disseminate messages. Unlike traditional censorship
of print or broadcast media, which interfered with writers and
speakers to control the source of information, this new form of
Internet-based censorship interferes with consumers by diverting
attention from controversial issues. Inconvenient speech is
drowned out rather than being banned outright3.
In Western democracies, by contrast, politicians cannot
orchestrate coverage in social and conventional media to their
liking. The power of democratic politicians to set the political
agenda is therefore limited, and it is conventionally assumed that
it is primarily the media, not politicians, that determine the
agenda of public discourse in liberal democracies4,5. Several lines
of evidence support this assumption. For example, coverage of
terrorist attacks in the New York Times has been causally linked
to further terrorist attacks, with one additional article producing
1.4 attacks over the following week6. Coverage of al-Qaeda in
premier US broadcast and print media has been causally linked to
additional terrorist attacks and increased popularity of the al-
Qaeda terrorist network7. Similarly, media coverage has been
identified as a driver—rather than an echo—of public support for
right-wing populist parties in the UK8. Further support for the
power of the media emerges from two quasi-experimental field
studies in the UK. In one case, when the Sun tabloid switched its
explicit endorsement from the Conservative party to Labour in
1997, and back again to the Conservatives in 2010, each switch
translated into an estimated additional 500,000 votes for the
favored party at the next election9. In another case, the long-
standing boycott of the anti-European Sun tabloid in the city of
Liverpool (arising from its untruthful coverage of a tragic stadium
incident in 1989 with multiple fatalities among Liverpool soccer
fans), rendered attitudes towards the European Union in Liver-
pool more positive than in comparable areas that did not boycott
the Sun10. In the United States, the gradual introduction of Fox
News coverage in communities around the country has been
directly linked to an increase in Republican vote share11. Finally,
a randomized field experiment in the US that controlled media
coverage of local papers by syndicating selected topics on ran-
domly chosen days, identified strong flow-on effects into public
discourse. The intervention increased public discussion of an
issue by more than 60%4.
This conventional view is, however, under scrutiny. More
nuanced recent analyses have invoked a market in which the
elites, mass media, and citizens seek to establish an equilibrium12.
In particular, the rapid rise of social media, including the micro-
blogging platform Twitter, has provided new avenues for political
agenda setting that have increasingly discernible impact. For
example, the content of Twitter discussions of the HPV vaccine
explains differences in vaccine uptake beyond those explainable
by other socioeconomic variables. Greater spread of mis-
information and conspiracy theories on Twitter are associated
with lower vaccination rates13. Similarly, fake news (fabricated
stories that are presented as news on social media) have
controlled the popularity of many issues in US politics14, mainly
owing to the responsiveness of partisan media outlets. The
entanglement of partisan media and social media is of con-
siderable generality and can sometimes override the agenda-
setting power of leading outlets such as the New York Times15.
One important characteristic of Twitter is that it allows poli-
ticians to directly influence the public’s political agenda16. For
example, as early as 2012, a sample of journalists acknowledged
their reliance on Twitter to generate stories and obtain quotes
from politicians17. With the appearance of Donald Trump on the
political scene, Twitter has been elevated to a central role in global
politics. President Trump has posted around 49,000 tweets as of
February 2020. To date, research has focused primarily on the
content of Donald Trump’s tweets18–21. Relatively less attention
has been devoted to the agenda-setting role of the tweets. Some
research has identified the number of retweets Trump receives as
a frequent positive predictor of news stories22 (Though see16 for a
somewhat contrary position.). During the 2016 election cam-
paign, Trump’s tweets on average received three times as much
attention than those of his opponent, Hillary Clinton, suggesting
that he was more successful at commanding public attention23.
Here we focus on one aspect of agenda-setting, namely Donald
Trump’s presumed strategic deployment of tweets to divert
attention away from issues that are potentially threatening or
harmful to the president24,25. Unlike the Chinese government,
which has a 50-cent army at its disposal, diversion can only work
for President Trump if he can directly move the media’s or the
public’s attention away from harmful issues. Anecdotally, there
are instances in which this diversion appears to have been suc-
cessful. For example, in late 2016, President-elect Trump
repeatedly criticized the cast of a Broadway play via Twitter after
the actors publically pleaded for a “diverse America.” This Twitter
event coincided with the revelation that Trump had agreed to a
$25 million settlement (including a $1 million penalty26) of
lawsuits against his (now defunct) Trump University. An analysis
of people’s internet search behavior using Google Trends con-
firmed that the public showed far greater interest in the Broadway
controversy than the Trump University settlement27, attesting to
the success of the presumed diversion. However, to date evidence
for diversion has remained anecdotal.
This article provides the first empirical test of the hypothesis
that President Trump’s use of Twitter diverts attention from news
that is politically harmful to him. In particular, we posit that any
increase in harmful media coverage may be followed by increased
diversionary Twitter activity. In turn, if this diversion is suc-
cessful, it should depress subsequent media coverage of the
harmful topic. To operationalize the analysis, we focused on the
Mueller investigation as a source of potentially threatening or
harmful media coverage. Special prosecutor Robert Mueller was
appointed in March 2017 to investigate Russian interference in
the 2016 election and potential links between the Trump cam-
paign and Russian officials. Given that legal scholars discussed
processes by which a sitting president could be indicted even
before Mueller delivered his report28,29, and given that Mueller
indicted associates of Trump during the investigation30, there can
be no doubt that this investigation posed a serious political risk to
Donald Trump during the first 2 years of his presidency.
The center panel of Fig. 1 provides an overview of the pre-
sumed statistical paths of this diversion. Any increase in harmful
media coverage, represented by the word cloud on the left, should
be followed by increased diversionary Twitter activity, which is
captured by the word cloud on the right. The expected increase is
represented by the “+” sign along that path. If this diversion is
successful, it should depress subsequent media coverage of the
harmful topic (path labeled by “−” to represent the opposite
direction of the association). Each of the two paths is represented
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by a regression model that relates Twitter activity (represented by
the number of relevant tweets) with media coverage (represented
by the number of reports concerning Russia-Mueller). We
approached the analysis in two ways: first, we used ordinary least
squares (OLS) in which each of the two paths was captured by a
separate regression model. Second, we used three-stage least
squares (3SLS) to estimate both path coefficients in a single model
simultaneously.
We obtained daily news coverage from two acknowledged
benchmark sources in TV and print media during the first 2 years
of Trump’s presidency (20 January 2017 – 20 January 2019): The
American Broadcasting Corporation’s ABC World News Tonight,
a 30-min daily evening news show that ranks first among all
evening news programs in the US31, and the New York Times
(NYT), which is widely considered to be the world’s most influ-
ential newspaper by leaders in business, politics, science, and
culture32. The NYT was also ranked first in the world, based on
traffic flow, by the international search engine 4IMN in 2016
(https://www.4imn.com/top200/). A recent quantitative analysis
of more than 800,000 news articles in the NYT through a com-
bination of machine learning and human judgment (involving a
sample of nearly 800 judges) has identified the New York Times as
being quite close to the political center, with a slight liberal
leaning (which was found to be smaller than, e.g., the corre-
sponding conservative slant of The Wall Street Journal)33. Simi-
larly, ABC News is known to be favored by centrist voters without
however being shunned by partisans on either side34. In the
online news ecosystem, ABC (combined with Yahoo!) and NYT
form some of the most central nodes in the network, and nearly
the entire online news audience tends to congregate at those
brand-name sites35.
Specification of diversionary topics on Twitter is challenging a
priori because potentially any topic, other than the Mueller
investigation itself, could be recruited by the president as a
diversionary effort. We addressed this problem in two ways. First,
we conducted a targeted analysis in which the diversionary topics
were stipulated a priori to be those that President Trump prefers
to talk about, based on our analysis of his political position
and rhetoric during the first 2 years of this presidency. Second, we
conducted an expanded analysis that considered the president’s
entire Twitter vocabulary as a potential source of diversion.
This analysis allowed for the possibility that Trump would
divert by highlighting topics other than those that he consistently
favors.
Both analyses included a number of controls and robustness
checks, such as randomization, sensitivity analyses, and the use of
placebo keywords, to rule out artifactual explanations. Both
analyses were approached in two different ways. The first
approach fitted two independent ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression models that (a) predicted diversion from Mueller
coverage and (b) captured a suppression of Mueller coverage in
the media as a downstream consequence of diversion (see Fig. 1
and “Methods”). The second approach used a three-stage least
squares (3SLS) regression model. In a 3SLS regression, multiple
equations are estimated simultaneously; in our case there are two
equations that capture diversion and suppression, respectively.
This approach is particularly suitable when phenomena may be
reciprocally causal.
Results
Targeted analysis. The targeted analysis focused on the associa-
tion between media coverage of the Mueller investigation and
President Trump’s use of Twitter to divert attention from that
coverage. The analysis also asked whether that diversion, if it is
triggered, might in turn suppress media coverage of the Mueller
investigation.
We assumed that the president’s tweets would divert attention
from Mueller to his preferred topics. We considered the three
keywords “China,” “jobs,” and “immigration” as markers of those
topics and explored all combinations of those words being used in
Trump’s tweets. Our choice of keywords was based on the
following considerations. First, at the time of analysis, which
predates the COVID-19 crisis, the US unemployment rate was at
its lowest in at least a decade (3.8% in 2019, monthly rates
provided by the Bureau of Labour Statistics averaged through
June; https://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab1.htm), and
President Trump is routinely claiming credit for job creation36.
The president has also made China-related issues some of his
main international policy topics (e.g., when it comes to
international trade)37, suggesting that this is also one of his focal
areas of political activity. Finally, controlling and curtailing
immigration was central to Trump’s election campaign and
continues to be a major policy plank. In further support of our
choice of keywords, an analysis of Donald Trump’s campaign
Fig. 1 The center panel shows a conceptual model of potential strategic diversion by Donald Trump via Twitter (where his handle is
@realDonaldTrump). The word cloud on the left contains the 50 most frequent words from all articles in the NYT that contained “Russia” or “Mueller” as
keywords. The NYT articles captured by the word cloud contained a total of 146,307 unique words. We excluded “president” and “Trump” because of their
outlying high frequency. In addition to the 50 words shown here, the top 1% of high-frequency items included terms such as “collusion,” “impeachment,”
“conspiracy,” and numerous names of actors relevant to the investigation, such as “Mueller,” “Putin,” “Comey,” “Manafort,” and so on. The word cloud on
the right represents the 50 most frequent words occurring in Donald Trump’s tweets that were chosen, on the basis of keywords, to represent his preferred
topics. The expected sign of the regression coefficient is shown next to each path and is identical for both approaches (OLS and 3SLS). The delay between
media coverage and diversionary tweets is assumed to be shorter than the subsequent response of the media to the diversion. This reflects the relative
sluggishness of the news cycle compared to Donald Trump’s instant-response capability on Twitter.
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promises in 2016 by independent fact-checker Politifact revealed
that the top 5 promises were consonant with our topic
keywords38. Early in his term, and during our sampling period,
job growth in the US and withdrawing from trade agreements
together with action on immigration were again identified as
being among the three issues the president “got most right”39. At
the time of this writing, a website by the Trump campaign
(https://www.promiseskept.com/) that is recording the president’s
accomplishments lists “Economy and Jobs,” “Immigration,” and
“Foreign Policy” as the first three items. The “Foreign Policy”
page, in turn, mentions China 12 times (with another nine
occurrences of “Chinese”). The only other countries mentioned
more than once were Israel (9), Iran (4), Canada (3), and Japan
(3). The word cloud on the right of Fig. 1 summarizes the content
of the diversionary tweets by showing the 50 most frequent words
used in the tweets (omitting function words and stop words).
Table 1 summarizes the results for two different variants of a
pair of independent OLS linear regression models using those
keywords (see “Methods” for details). Standard errors derived
from conventional OLS analyses are displayed in parentheses,
whereas Newey-West adjusted standard errors that accommodate
potential autocorrelations are reported in brackets (see “Methods”
for a detailed discussion of the variables in the regression
models). The Supplementary information reports a full explora-
tion of the autocorrelation structure of the data (Tables S2–S5).
All analyses included the relevant lags to model autocorrelations.
The first model predicted diversion, represented by the number of
times the three diversionary keywords appeared in tweets, from
adverse media coverage on the same day and is shown in the first
three columns of the table. If the president’s tweets about his
preferred issues lead to diversion, then regression coefficients for
the diversion model should be positive and statistically sig-
nificant. The table shows that this was indeed observed for all
media coverage (NYT, ABC, and the combination of the two
formed by averaging their standardized coverage). The magnitude
of the associations is illustrated in the top row of panels in Fig. 2.
Numerically, each additional ABC News headline containing
Russia or Mueller would have been associated with 0.2 additional
mentions of one of our keywords in tweets (column 2 in Table 1).
The second model, which predicted media coverage as a
function of the number of diversionary tweets on the previous
day, is shown in the rightmost three columns in Table 1. If the
diversion was successful, then these regression coefficients are
expected to be negative, indicating suppression of potentially
harmful media coverage by the president’s tweets. The table
shows that threatening media coverage was negatively associated
with diversionary tweets. The magnitude of the association is
illustrated in the bottom row of panels in Fig. 2. Each additional
keyword mention in tweets is associated with a decrease of nearly
one-half of an occurrence of “Russia” or “Mueller” from the next
day’s NYT (column 4 in Table 1). Table 1 provides an existence
proof for the relationships of interest. The Supplementary
information reports an additional, more nuanced set of analyses
for different combinations and subsets of the three critical
keywords (Tables S7–S12). These analyses generally confirm the
overall pattern in Table 1.
One problematic aspect of this initial analysis is that artifactual
explanations for the pattern cannot be ruled out. In particular,
although one interpretation of these estimates is consistent with
our hypotheses of (1) media coverage causing diversion and (2)
the diversion in turn suppressing media coverage, the available
data do not permit an unequivocal interpretation. Specifically,
remaining endogeneity concerns (measurement error, reverse
causality, and omitted variables) threaten a pure interpretation of
these results as causal. We address each of those concerns in turn,
and the associated conclusions suggest endogeneity would be
unlikely to fully explain away our findings.
First, measurement error is unlikely to explain the relationships
we found given that we draw from the universe of all NYT
articles, ABC News segments, and Trump tweets in our sample
period. Even if we were to miss some articles, news segments, or
tweets (perhaps because our keywords did not fully catch all
relevant articles or news segments), it is not clear how this would
produce a systematic bias in one direction that could fundamen-
tally influence our estimates. We support this judgment by
displaying word clouds of all selected content (e.g., Fig. 1). If we
systematically mismeasured the content of tweets and media
coverage, the word clouds would reveal the error through
intrusion of unexpected content or absence of content that would
be expected to be present based on knowledge of the topic.
Similarly, there are reasons to believe that reverse causality
cannot fully account for our results. For the first model
(diversion; columns 1-3 in Table 1), it is less likely that Trump’s
diversionary tweets could generate more news about the Mueller
investigation on the same day than the reverse, namely that more
news generate more tweets. Given the lag time of news reports,
even in the digital age, there is limited opportunity for a tweet to
generate coverage within the same 24-h period. Moreover, even
Table 1 Predicting diversionary tweets (CJI) from threatening media coverage (Russia-Mueller; columns 1–3) and predicting
suppression from diversionary tweets (columns 4–6).
Dependent variable CJI tweetst NYTa ABCa Averageb










CJI tweetst−1 o o o −0.403 −0.038 −0.050
(0.207) p= 0.052 (0.020) p= 0.052 (0.020) p= 0.016
[0.219] p= 0.066 [0.020] p= 0.061 [0.022] p= 0.024
N 721 721 721 703 710 703
Each model included control variables for each week during the sampling period and long-term time trends as well as the appropriate number of lagged observations for the dependent variable (see
“Methods”). Table entries are coefficients (OLS standard errors) [Newey-West standard errors].
aCoverage of Russia-Mueller on day t.
bAverage of the standardized values of coverage of NYT and ABC.
oLagged predictor is shown only when of interest.
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putting aside that timing constraint, there is no obvious
mechanism that would explain why the media systematically
reports more on Mueller/Russia because President Trump
tweeted on “China,” “jobs,” or “immigration”—we are not able
to formulate a hypothesis why the media would respond in this
manner. The reverse, however, motivated our analysis, namely
the hypothesis that when Trump is confronted with uncomfor-
table media coverage, he tweets about unrelated topics. For the
suppression model (columns 4–6 in Table 1), the fact that we
predict news today with Trump’s tweets from yesterday reduces
concerns about reverse causality. One might still entertain the
possibility that Trump’s tweets divert pre-emptively, in expecta-
tion of Mueller coverage tomorrow. However, that would, if
anything, work against us detecting suppression. If Trump’s
tweets are pre-emptive, we should see more tweets on days prior
to increased Mueller coverage, thus creating a positive associa-
tion. However, we observed a statistically significant negative
relationship, which is the opposite of what is expected under the
hypothetical anticipation scenario. The negative association is,
however, entirely consonant with our hypothesis that diversion
may be effective and may reduce inconvenient media coverage.
By contrast, we consider the hidden role of omitted variables to
be the largest threat to causal identification. In the absence of
controlled experimentation (or another empirical identification
strategy suited to identify causality), one can never be certain that
an effect is not caused by hidden omitted variables that interfere
in the presumed causal path. This is an in-principle problem that
no observational study can overcome with absolute certainty. It is,
however, possible to test whether omitted variables are likely to
explain the observed pattern. Our first line of attack was to
conduct a sensitivity analysis to obtain a robustness value for the
diversion and suppression models involving average media
coverage (columns 3 and 6 in Table 1)40. The robustness value
captures the minimum strength of association that any
unobserved omitted variables must have with the variables in
the model (predictor and outcome) to change the statistical
conclusions. The details of the sensitivity analysis are reported in
the Supplementary information (Fig. S1 and Table S6). The
results further lend support to our hypothesis that adverse media
coverage causes the president to engage in diversion, and that this
diversion, in turn, causes the media to reduce that coverage,
although endogeneity from potentially omitted variables remains
less likely to be a concern for the diversion model than the
suppression model (see Fig. S1 and Table S6 for detailed
quantification).
We additionally tackled the omitted-variable problem by fitting
both models (diversion and suppression) simultaneously using
3SLS (see “Methods”). Table 2 reveals that the 3SLS results
replicated the overall pattern of the OLS analysis, although the
significance of the suppression is attenuated. A noteworthy aspect
of our 3SLS analysis is that it used two ways to model the
temporal offset between tweets and subsequent, potentially
suppressed, media coverage. In panel A in Table 2, we used
yesterday’s tweets to predict today’s coverage. This parallels the
a b c
d e f
Fig. 2 Association between media coverage of Russia/Mueller and diversionary tweets (top row of panel), and association between diversionary
tweets and subsequent media coverage (bottom row of panels). NYT is shown in panels (a, d); ABC news in panels (b, e); and the average of the two in
panels (c, f).
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OLS analyses from Table 1. In panel B, by contrast, we predicted
tomorrow’s coverage from today’s tweets. The pattern is
remarkably similar across both panels: There are strong and
nearly-uniformly statistically significant coefficients of adverse
media coverage predicting diversion. Conversely, all coefficients
for suppression are negative, although their level of significance is
more heterogeneous.
The 3SLS results further diminish the likelihood of an
artifactual explanation: for omitted variables to explain the
observed joint pattern of diversion and suppression, those
confounders would have to simultaneously explain a positive
association between two variables on the same day and a negative
association from one day to the next across two different intervals
—namely from yesterday to today as well as from today to
tomorrow. Moreover, those omitted variables would have to exert
their effect in the presence of more than 100 other control
variables and a large number of lagged variables. We consider this
possibility to be unlikely.
Finally, to further explore whether the observed pattern of
diversion and suppression was a specific response to harmful
coverage, we conducted a parallel analysis using Brexit as a
placebo topic. Like the Mueller inquiry, Brexit was a prominent
issue throughout most of the sampling period and not under
President Trump’s control. Unlike Mueller, however, Brexit was
not potentially harmful to the president—on the contrary, British
campaigners to leave the European Union were linked to Trump
and his team41. Table 3 shows the results of a model predicting
diversionary tweets using the same three Twitter keywords but
NYT coverage of Brexit as a predictor (using 24 days of lagged
variables as suggested by an analysis of autocorrelations). Figure 3
illustrates the content of the Brexit coverage and confirms that the
topic does not touch on issues that are likely to be politically
harmful to the president. ABC News did not report on Brexit with
sufficient frequency to permit analysis. Neither of the coefficients
involving NYT are statistically significant, as one would expect for
media coverage that is of no concern to the president.
To provide a more formal contrast between Brexit and Russia-
Mueller, we combined the two models (Brexit: column 1 of
Table 3; Russia-Mueller: column 1 of Table 1) into a single system
of equations for a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
analysis42. Within a SUR framework, the consequences of
constraining individual parameters can be jointly estimated for
the two models. We found that forcing the coefficient for NYT
Russia-Mueller coverage to be zero led to a significant loss of fit,
χ2(1)= 6.15, p= 0.013, whereas setting the coefficient to zero for
Brexit coverage had no effect, χ2(1)= 1.41, p > 0.1. (Forcing both
coefficients to be equal entailed no significant loss of fit, owing to
the imprecision with which the Brexit coefficient was estimated,
with a 95% confidence interval that spanned zero and was nearly
five times wider than for Russia-Mueller.)
Considered as a whole, these targeted analyses suggest that,
during the sampling period, President Trump’s tweets about his
preferred topics diverted attention from inconvenient media
coverage. That diversion, in turn, appears to be followed by
suppression of the inconvenient coverage. Because we have no
experimental control over the data, this conclusion must be
caveated by allowing for the possibility that the results instead
reflect the operation of hidden variables. However, additional
analyses to explore that possibility produce results to discount
that possibility, at least for the diversion model. We acknowledge
that the status of the suppression effect is less robust in statistical
terms. The expanded analysis further buttresses our conclusion
by showing its generality and robustness.
Expanded analysis. Although the Twitter keywords for the tar-
geted analysis were chosen to reflect the president’s preferred
topics, the president may divert using other issues as well. The
expanded analysis therefore considered all pairs of words in the
president’s Twitter vocabulary (see “Methods”).
For each word pair, we modeled diversion as a function of
Russia-Mueller media coverage and suppression of subsequent
coverage either using two independent OLS models, or using a
Table 2 Three-stage least squares (3SLS) models to predict diversionary tweets (CJI) from threatening media coverage (Russia-
Mueller; columns 1–3) and predicting suppression from diversionary tweets (columns 4–6) simultaneously.
Dependent variable CJI tweetst NYTa ABCa Averageb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









CJI tweetst−1 o o o −0.399 −0.038 −0.050
(0.207) p= 0.054 (0.018) p= 0.037 (0.019) p= 0.010
N 703 710 703 703 710 703









CJI tweetst o o o −0.732 −0.090 −0.094
(0.620) p= 0.238 (0.054) p= 0.095 (0.057) p= 0.099
N 702 709 702 702 709 702
aCoverage of Russia-Mueller on day t (panel A) or day t+ 1 (panel B).
bAverage of the standardized values of coverage of NYT and ABC.
cEach model included control variables for each week during the sampling period and long-term time trends as well as the appropriate number of lagged observations for the dependent variable (see
“Methods”). Table entries are coefficients (standard errors).
oLagged predictor is shown only when of interest.
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single 3SLS model for both equations simultaneously. The
suppression component of the latter model, in turn, either
predicted today’s coverage from yesterday’s tweets or tomorrow’s
coverage from today’s tweets, paralleling the results in panels A
and B, respectively, of Table 2.
Figure 4 shows results from the expanded analysis for
coverage of Russia-Mueller in the NYT (panels a–c), ABC News
(d–f), and the average of both (g–i). Each data point represents a
pair of words whose co-occurrence in tweets is predicted by
media coverage (position along X-axis) and whose association
with subsequent media coverage is also observed (position along
Y-axis). Each point thus represents a diversion and a suppression
regression simultaneously. The further to the right a point is
located, the more frequently the corresponding word pair occurs
on days with increasing Russia-Mueller coverage. The lower a
point is located, the less Russia-Mueller is covered in the media
on the following day as a function of increasing use of the
corresponding word pair. If there is no association between the
president’s Twitter vocabulary and surrounding media coverage,
then all points should lie in the center and largely within the
significance bounds represented by the red lines. If there is only
diversion, then the point cloud should be shifted to the right. If
there is diversion followed by suppression, then a notable share of
the point cloud should fall into the bottom-right quadrant.
Figure 4 shows that irrespective of how the data were analyzed
(OLS or two variants of 3SLS; columns of panels from left to
right), in each instance a notable share of the point cloud sits
outside the significance bounds (red lines) in the bottom-right
quadrant (summarized further in the Supplementary Table S14).
These points represent word pairs that occur significantly more
frequently in Donald Trump’s tweets when Russia-Mueller
coverage increases (i.e., they lie to the right of the vertical red
line), and that are in turn followed by significantly reduced media
coverage of Russia-Mueller on the following day (i.e., they lie
below the horizontal red line). The results are remarkably similar
across rows of panels, suggesting considerable synchronicity
between the NYT (top row) and ABC (center). The synchronicity
is further highlighted in the bottom row of panels, which show
the data for the average of the standardized values of coverage in
the NYT and ABC.
To provide a chance-alone comparison, the figure also shows
the results for the same set of regressions when the Twitter
timeline is randomized for each word pair. This synthetic null
distribution is represented by the gray contour lines in each panel
(the red perimeters represent the 95% boundary). The contrast
between the observed data and what would be expected from
randomness alone is striking.
To illustrate the linguistic aspects of the observed pattern, the
word cloud in Fig. 5 visualizes the words present in all the pairs of
words in tweets that occurred significantly more often in response
to Russia/Mueller coverage in NYT and ABC News (average of
standardized coverage) and that were associated with successful
suppression of coverage the next day. The prominence of the
keywords from our targeted analysis is immediately apparent.
The Supplementary information presents additional quantitative
information about those tweets (Table S15).
We performed two control analyses involving placebo key-
words to explore whether the observed pattern of diversion and
suppression in Fig. 4 reflected a systematic interaction between
the president and the media rather than an unknown artifact.
The first control analysis involved NYT Brexit coverage (ABC
coverage was too infrequent for analysis, with only a single
mention during the sampling period.) For this analysis, articles
that contained “Russia” or “Mueller” were excluded to avoid
contamination of the placebo coverage by the threatening topic.
The pattern for Brexit (Fig. 6) differs from the results for Russia-
Mueller. Although Brexit coverage stimulates Twitter activity by
President Trump (i.e., points to the right of vertical red line), the
word pairs that fall outside the significance boundary tend to be
distributed across all four quadrants.
The second control analysis examined other placebo topics
using the OLS approach, represented by the NYT keywords
“skiing,” “football,” “economy,” “vegetarian,” and “gardening”
(Fig. 7). The keywords were chosen to span a variety of unrelated
domains and were assumed not to be harmful or threatening to
the president. For this analysis, the corpus was again restricted to
articles that contained neither “Russia” nor “Mueller” to guard
against contamination of the coverage by a threatening topic. For
most of these keywords, ABC News headlines had zero or one
mention only. The exceptions were “football” and “economy,”
which had 40 and 39 occurrences, respectively. We analyzed ABC
News for those two keywords and found the same pattern as for
all placebo topics in the NYT. Across the 5 keywords, less than
0.03% of the word pairs (2 out of 7425 for OLS) fell into the
Table 3 Predicting diversionary tweets (CJI) from Brexit
media coverage (column 1) and predicting suppression from
diversionary tweets (column 2).









Each model included control variables for each week during the sampling period and long-term
time trends as well as the appropriate number of lagged observations for the dependent variable
(see “Methods”). Table entries are coefficients (OLS standard errors) [Newey-West standard
errors].
aCoverage of Brexit on day t.
oLagged predictor is shown only when of interest.
Fig. 3 Word cloud representation of the top 50 words used in the NYT in
their coverage of Brexit. Size of each word corresponds to its frequency, as
does font color. The darker the font, the greater the frequency.
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Fig. 4 Association between Russia-Mueller coverage in the media and diversion, and association between diversion and subsequent Russia-Mueller
coverage. The top row of panels shows the results for the NYT (panels (a–c)). The center (d–f) and bottom (g–i) row of panels show results for ABC News
and the average of both media outlets, respectively. The left column of panels (a, d, g) shows results from two independent OLS models, the center column
(b, e, h) is for a single 3SLS model in which suppression is modeled by relating yesterday’s tweets to today’s coverage, and the right column (c, f, i) is a
3SLS model in which suppression is modeled by relating today’s tweets to tomorrow’s coverage. In each panel, the axes show jittered t-values of the
regression coefficients for diversion (X-axis) and suppression (Y-axis). Each point represents diversion and suppression for one pair of words in the Twitter
vocabulary. Red vertical and horizontal lines denote significance thresholds (±1.96). Word pairs that are triggered by Mueller coverage (p < 0.05) and
affect subsequent coverage (p < 0.05) are plotted in red. The gray contour lines in each panel show the distribution of points obtained if the timeline of
tweets is randomized (red perimeter represents 95% cutoff, see “Methods”). The blue rugs represent univariate distributions.
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bottom-right quadrant. This number is 40 times smaller than for
the parallel NYT analysis for Russia-Mueller.
Discussion
Our analysis presents empirical evidence that is consistent with
the hypothesis that President Trump’s use of social media leads to
systematic diversion, which in turn may suppress media coverage
that is potentially harmful to him. This association was observed
after controlling for long-term trends (linear and quadratic),
week-to-week fluctuations, and accounting for substantial levels
of potential autocorrelations in the dependent variable. The
pattern was observed when diversionary topics were chosen a
priori to represent the president’s preferred political issues, and it
also emerged when all possible topics in the president’s Twitter
vocabulary were considered.
Crucially, in our analysis the diversion and suppression were
absent with placebo topics that present no political threat to the
president, ranging from Brexit to various neutral topics such as
hobbies and food preferences. Our data thus provide empirical
support for anecdotal reports suggesting that the president may
be employing diversion to escape scrutiny following harmful
media coverage and, ideally, to reduce additional harmful media
coverage24,27,43.
Our evidence for diversion is strictly statistical and limited to
two media outlets—albeit those commonly acknowledged to be
agenda setting in American public discourse—and it is possible
that other outlets might show a different pattern. It is also pos-
sible that the observed associations do not reflect causal rela-
tionships. These possibilities do not detract from the fact,
however, that leading media organs in the US are intertwined
with the president’s public speech in an intriguing manner. We
also cannot infer intentionality from these data. It remains
unclear whether the president is aware of his strategic deployment
of Twitter or acts on the basis of intuition. It is notable in this
context that a recent content analysis of Donald Trump’s tweets
identified substantial linguistic differences between factually
correct and incorrect tweets, permitting out-of-sample classifi-
cations with 73% accuracy44. The existence of linguistic markers
for factually incorrect tweets makes it less likely that those tweets
represent random errors and suggests that they may be crafted
more systematically. In other contexts, deliberate deception has
also been shown to affect language use45.
Questions surrounding intentionality also arise with the reci-
pients of the diversion. It is particularly notable that results
consistent with suppression were observed for the New York
Times, whose coverage has responded strongly to accusations
from the president that it spreads fake news, treating those
accusations as a badge of honor for professional journalism46.
The NYT explicitly warns of the impact of Trump’s presidency on
journalistic standards such as self-censorship, thus curtailing the
president’s interpretative power. These actions render it unlikely
that the NYT would intentionally reduce its coverage of topics
that are potentially harmful to the president. The fact that sup-
pression nonetheless occurs implies that important editorial
Fig. 5 Word cloud representation of the word pairs in tweets that were
associated with significant diversion and suppression. The pair structure
is ignored in this representation. Size of each word corresponds to its
frequency, as does font color. The darker the font, the greater the
frequency.
a b c
Fig. 6 The association between Brexit coverage in the NYT and diversion, and the association between diversion and subsequent Brexit coverage. For
this analysis, only NYT articles that did not mention Russia or Mueller were considered (N= 101, 435). Panel (a) is for two independent OLS models, panel
(b) is a single 3SLS model in which suppression is modeled by relating yesterday’s tweets to today’s coverage, and c is a 3SLS model in which suppression
is modeled by relating today’s tweets to tomorrow’s coverage. In each panel, the axes show jittered t-values of the regression coefficients for diversion (X-
axis) and suppression (Y-axis). Each point represents diversion and suppression for one pair of words in the Twitter vocabulary. Red vertical and horizontal
lines denote significance thresholds (±1.96). Word pairs that are triggered by coverage of the corresponding keyword (p < 0.05) and affect subsequent
coverage (p < 0.05) are plotted in red. The gray contour lines in each panel show the distribution of points obtained if the timeline of tweets is randomized
(red perimeter represents 95% cutoff, see “Methods”). The blue rugs represent univariate distributions.
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decisions may be influenced by contextual variables without the
editors’ intention—or indeed against their stated policies. This
finding is not without precedent. Other research has also linked
media coverage to extraneous variables that are unlikely to have
been explicitly considered by editors or journalists. For example,
opinion articles about climate change in major American media
have been found to be more likely to reflect the scientific con-
sensus after particularly warm seasons, whereas “skeptical” opi-
nions are more prevalent after cooler temperatures47.
It is worth drawing links between our results and the literature
on the diversionary theory of war48. Although it is premature to
claim consensual status for the notion that politicians launch wars
to divert attention from domestic problems, recent work in his-
tory and political science has repeatedly shown an association
between domestic indicators, such as poor economic performance
or waning electoral prospects, and the use of military force48–51.
Perhaps ironically, this association is particularly strong in
democracies49. Against this background, the notion that the
president’s tweets divert attention from inconvenient coverage
appears unsurprising.
Finally, we connect our analysis of diversion to other rhetorical
techniques linked to President Trump52. Each of these presents a
rich avenue for further exploration. One related technique
involves deflection, which differs from diversion by directly
attacking the media (e.g., accusing them of spreading fake
news)25. Another technique involves pre-emptive framing, by
launching information with a new angle52. An extension of pre-
emptive framing may involve the notion of inoculation, which is
the idea that by anticipating inconvenient information, the public
may be more resilient to its impact53. Inoculation has been shown
to be particularly useful in the context of protecting the public
against misinformation54, and it remains to be seen whether pre-
emptive tweets by the President may affect the media or the
public in their response to an unfolding story.
The availability of social media has provided politicians with a
powerful tool. Our data suggest that, whether intentionally or not,
President Trump exploits this tool to divert the attention of
mainstream media. Further investigation is needed to understand
if future US presidents or other global leaders will use the tool in a
similar way.
Our findings have implications for journalistic practice. The
American media have, for centuries, given much emphasis to the
president’s statements. This tradition is challenged by presidential
diversions in bites of 280 characters. How journalistic practice
can be adapted to escape those diversions is one of the defining
challenges to the media for the twenty-first century.
Methods
Materials. The sampling period covered 731 days, from Donald Trump’s inau-
guration (20 January 2017) through the end of his 2nd year in office (January 20,
2019). We sampled content items from three sources: (1) all of Donald Trump’s
tweets from the @realDonaldTrump handle. Tweets that only contained weblinks
or were empty after filtering of special characters and punctuation were removed.
(2) All of the full-text coverage of the New York Times (NYT) available through its
online archive. (3) The headlines of all content items covered by the American
Broadcasting Corporation’s (ABC) World News Tonight (daily at 7:30 p.m.).
Headlines were obtained from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive (VTNA;
https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu). Summary statistics for the content items are avail-
able in the Supplementary information (Table S1).
Search keys for the targeted analysis
Threatening media content. We used the search keys “Russia OR Mueller” to
identify media content that was potentially threatening to President Trump. For
each day in the sampling period, we counted how many news items in each of our
media sources, NYT and ABC, contained one or both of those keywords.
Diversionary Twitter topics. We used the search keys “China,” “jobs,” and
“immigration” to identify potentially diverting content in Donald Trump’s tweets.
For each day in the sampling period, we counted the number of times any of those
keywords appeared in the tweets for that day.
Fig. 7 Analysis of placebo keywords. Top row of panels shows the results of the expanded analysis using two independent OLS models for the placebo
keywords “economy” (panel (a)); “football” (b); “gardening” (c); “skiiing” (d); and “vegetarian” (e). In each panel, the axes show jittered t-values of the
regression coefficients for diversion (X-axis) and suppression (Y-axis). Each point represents diversion and suppression for one pair of words in the Twitter
vocabulary. Red vertical and horizontal lines denote significance thresholds (±1.96). Word pairs that are triggered by coverage of the corresponding
keyword (p < 0.05) and affect subsequent coverage (p < 0.05) are plotted in red. The gray contour lines in each panel show the distribution of points
obtained if the timeline of tweets is randomized (red perimeter represents 95% cutoff, see “Methods”). The blue rugs represent univariate distributions.
The word clouds accompanying each plot represent the 50 most frequent words found in the NYT articles selected on the basis of the corresponding
keyword.
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Keywords for the expanded analysis. The expanded analysis tested all possible
pairs of words in Donald Trump’s Twitter vocabulary. The vocabulary comprised
words that occurred at least 150 times and were not stopwords. (The results are not
materially affected if the occurrence threshold is lowered to 100.) Stopwords (such
as “the” or “are”) are considered unimportant for text analysis. Here we identified
stopwords using the SMART option for R package tm. We also removed numbers
and web links (URLs). Because focus was on diversion, we also excluded “Russia,”
“Mueller,” and “collusion,” yielding a final vocabulary of N= 55 (N= 1485 unique
pairs). Each pair was used as a set of keywords in a separate regression analysis.
The average number of vocabulary items in a tweet was 2.95 (s= 2.26), and we
therefore considered two vocabulary words to be sufficient to uniquely identify the
topic of a tweet.
Control variables. All regression models included at least 106 control variables. A
separate intercept was modeled for each of the weeks (N= 104) during the sam-
pling period to account for potential endogenous short-term fluctuations. The date
(number of days since January 1, 1960), and square of the date, were entered as two
additional control variables to account for long-term trends. In addition, lagged
variables were included as suggested by a detailed examination of the underlying
autocorrelation structures.
Autocorrelation structure. We established the autocorrelation structure for each
of the variables under consideration by regressing the observations on day t onto
the 106 control variables and a varying number of lagged observations of the
dependent variable from days t− 1, t− 2,…, t− k. Supplementary Tables S2–S5
report the analyses, which identified the maximum lag (k) for each variable. For
tweets, the suggested lag was k= 10, and for NYT, ABC, and the average it was k=
28, k= 21, and k= 28, respectively. All regressions (OLS and 3SLS; see below)
included the appropriate k lagged variables.
OLS regression models. The ordinary least-squares (OLS) analyses involved two
independently estimated regression models. The first model examined whether
Donald Trump’s tweets divert the media from threatening media coverage. Given
the president’s ability to respond nearly instantaneously to media coverage, we
considered media coverage and tweets on the same day. That is, we regressed the
number of diverting keywords in tweets posted on day t on the number of
threatening news items also on day t.
The second model examined whether Donald Trump’s diverting tweets affected
media coverage relating to the potentially threatening topics. This analysis used the
number of diverting keywords in the tweets on day t− 1 as a predictor for
threatening coverage on day t. The second model thus assumed a lag between
tweets (on day t− 1) and an association between those tweets and media coverage
(day t) to reflect the delay inherent in the news cycle. This model again also
included media coverage on day t− 1 to capture the inherent momentum of
a topic.
All analyses were conducted in R and Stata, either using a robust
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimation of the covariance matrix of the coefficient
estimates (i.e., function vcovHC in the sandwich library with the HC1 option) or
using Newey-West standard errors that are designed to deal with autocorrelated
time-series data (NeweyWest option for function coeftest in R). For a subset of the
targeted analysis, the results were reproduced in Stata as a cross-check. All
statistical results reported in all tables here and in the Supplementary information
are based on two-tailed t-tests for the coefficients and are not adjusted for
multiple tests.
Because the dependent variables were event counts, a negative binomial
regression is often considered to be the most appropriate model for analysis. We
report a negative binomial analysis of our main results in the Supplementary
information (Table S13). However, negative binomial regressions are known to
suffer from frequent convergence problems, and the present analysis was no
exception, with the suppression model for ABC failing to converge. In addition, the
suppression model for average media coverage cannot be analyzed by a binomial
model because the dependent variable (the average of standardized coverage for
each media outlet) does not involve counted data. For those reasons, we report the
OLS results.
3SLS regression models. Given that we expected a tight coupling between
diversion and suppression, we applied a three-stage-least-squares (3SLS) regression
approach to analyze the coupled system of equations55. The 3SLS model jointly
predicted Trump’s distracting tweets today as a function of adverse coverage on the
same day, and Mueller/Russia news today as a function of those tweets yesterday.
Because the two components of the 3SLS analysis (diversion and suppression) span
different days, we explored another approach in which the suppression was esti-
mated as tomorrow’s media coverage as a function of today’s tweets. The 3SLS
models were fit using Stata’s reg3 command (called from R via the RStata package).
Noise-only distribution for expanded analysis. To create a distribution of t-
values for the coefficients of the expanded analysis when only noise was present,
the expanded analysis was repeated for each word pair with the Twitter timeline
randomized anew. Randomization disrupts any potential relationship between
media coverage and the president’s tweets. The density of the bivariate distribution
of the t-values associated with the regression coefficients was estimated via a two-
dimensional Gaussian kernel using the kde2d function in the R packageMASS. The
distribution from this randomized analysis should be centered on the origin and be
confined largely within the bivariate significance bounds. The contours of the
estimated densities are shown in Figs. 4, 6, and 7 as gray lines, with a perimeter line
(in red) representing the 95th percentile.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
A reporting summary is available as a Supplementary Information file. All data is
available at https://osf.io/f9bqx/.
Code availability
All source code for analysis is available at https://osf.io/f9bqx/.
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